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NOTE AND COMMENT
WILLARD TITUS BARBOUR.-Legal scholarship in America suffered a grievous
loss in the death of Willard T. Barbour, Charles F. Southmayd Professor of
Law in the Yale Law School on March 2, i92o. Indeed it is not too much to
say that his loss will be felt wherever the English Common Law holds its
sway, for he had dipped deep into the obscured origins of Equity Jurisdiction
during his study at Oxford and in London, and was but at the beginning of a
series of studies and lectures which would ultimately have developed into a
comprehensive book, throwing light not only upon the beginnings of equity,
but explaining much that has remained obscure in the doctrines derived from
an earlier day.
Professor Barbour had been called to Yale in the fall of i919 and had
already won a place for himself there. He had just begun his series of
lectures on the Carpentier foundation on the History of English Law at
Columbia University when his untimely end came. As has been said in the
memorial adopted by the faculty of the Michigan Law School "he stood upon
the threshold of his career but the door was thrown wide open before him."
Professor Barbour held the degrees of A.B., A.M., and LL.B. from the
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University of Michigan. He had won distinction as an undergraduate and as a
graduate in history and a career was open to him in that field. He decided,
however, to study law and in our Law School won the respect and affection of
all who knew him well. After an unusually fruitful period of study at Oxford,
where he laid the foundations for his work "THE HISTORY OV CONTRACT IN
EARLY ENGLISH EQUITY" under Sir Paul Vinogradoff, he was called in 1912 to
an assistant professorship in this Law School. Here his work was interrupted
for two years by illness, but in 1914 he resumed teaching and in 1915 began
carrying a full program, including the courses in Equity and the History of
English Law. His unusually broad foundation, a mind acting with lightning-
like rapidity and a passion for accuracy and thoroughness, together with an
appealing personality, brought to him marked success from the outset. Be-
sides the courses mentioned, he at one time gave that in Criminal Law and
had been teaching Future and Conditional Interests in Property for two years
before he left this School.
It will be seen that Professor Barbour's experience was almost exclusively
academic in character; but it is a remarkable fact, well recognized by his col-
leagues, that he showed a really extraordinary aptitude for and understanding
of practice and procedure and of the practical considerations in litigation.
This capacity, surprising in view of the fact that he had not practiced at the
bar, grew probably out of his unusually keen perceptive faculties and from
his arduous experience in the Records Office in London in working out the
procedure in hundreds of early English cases which none but himself had
examined for centuries. This unusual combination of qualities assured for
him a constantly growing measure of influence and reputation.
We sorely regretted his leaving us in the fall of 1919 to accept the flatter-
ing call from Yale University, but we rejoice that another group of law
teachers besides our own had had the opportunity to know him intimately.
We would not have been content to leave our good friends at Yale in easy
possession of him, but wherever he might have been he would have added
constantly to the achievements of legal scholarship and to the prestige and
serviceableness of our profession.
This is perhaps not the place for the most intimate expression of our
personal affection for the man who has gone nor an estimate of his purely
personal qualities, and yet we cannot refrain utterly, for Willard Barbour
possessed qualities which made him unusually interesting and stimulating as
a colleague and gave to the quality of his friendship a strength and an appeal
and fineness which it is not given to men to meet often in life. A very wide
circle of friends among colleagues and students in three law schools mourn
the loss of a brilliant scholar and teacher and a friend of unswerving loyalty,
and unselfish affection.
COND MNATION OV PROPERTY AGAINST USE FOR APARTMENT BUILDING.-
The General Statutes of Minnesota, Supplement 1917, secs. 1639-ro to 1639-
16 (Laws of 1915, c. 128) provide for the creation of restricted residence
districts in cities of the first class on petition of 50 per cent of the ,;wners
of real estate therein. The City Council is given tl'e power of eminent
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domain to enforce its provisions. The City of Minneapolis passed an ordi-
nance pursuant thereto forbidding, inter alia, the erection of apartment build-
ings in certain districts. In a mandamus proceeding by the relator to compel
the issuance of a building permit for an apartment house it was held, Hallam
and Holt, JJ. dissenting, condemnation cannot be had for a use which is not
public and the condemnation against the use of property for an apartment
house is not a public use. State ex rel Twin City Building and Investment Co.
v. Houghton (Minn., 1919) 174 N. W. 885. On rehearing, the decision was
reversed on the ground that the act contemplated would come within the scope
of the police power. State v. Houghton (Minn., 192o) 176 N. W. 159.
The right of a municipality by ordinances and by-laws under state
authority to regulate the mode of living and provide for the public health,
morals, safety, welfare and comfort are classified primarily into three groups:
those of Police Power, Eminent Domain and Taxation. These powers do not
spring from any delegation of constitutional power but "underlie the constitu-
tion and rest upon necessity, because there can be no effective government
without them." "They exist as a necessary attribute of sovereignty." People
v. Adirondack Ry. Co. (I89), i6o N. Y. 225, 236-238. Prima facie, they are
unlimited. That government may not become despotic the fundamental law-
the constitution-has placed restrictions on their use. In determining there-
fore, the appropriate length to which their exercise may be carried, it is neces-
sary to look rather to these restrictions than to the inherent scope of the
powers. Through a period of judicial construction the meaning of such
phrases as "private property shall not be taken for a public use without just
compensation," (U. S. Constitution, Art. V, Amendments), or "shall not be
destroyed for public use without just compensation therefor first paid or
secured." (Art. I, Sec. 13, Constitution of Minnesota), have received some-
thing like definite and fixed meanings. Due to the intense practicality and the.
variety of conditions under which the questions arise no specific definition can
hope to more than imply the nature of the powers. In C. B. & Q. Ry. Co. v.
Illinois, 200 U. S. 561, at p. 592, the Court in discussing the first of the powers
enumerated, says, "The police power of a state embraces regulations designed
to promote the public convenience or the general prosperity as well as regul-
tions designed to promote the public health, the public morals or the public
safety." In Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U. S. 225, these words were cited
with approval. Of the second of these powers .in Trenton Water Power Co.
v. Raff, 36 N. J. L. 355, the Court says, "The destruction of private property
either total or partial or the diminution of its value by an act of the govern-
ment directly and not merely incidentally affecting it, which deprives the
owner of the ordinary use of it, is a taking within the meaning of the con-
stitutional provision and the power can only be exercised under the right of
eminent domain subject to the constitutional limitation of making just com-
pensation." The third power, that of taxation, is very: generally said to rest on
the same consideration as the power of eminent domain on the question of the
purposes for which it may be resorted to. In Lowell v. Boston, iii Mass. 454,
where taxpayers objected to taxation to provide the payment of bonds issued
to assist by loans, owners of land burned over in the Boston fire, the Court,
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in holding the taxation not for a public purpose and therefore void, says,
"So far as it concerns the question of what constitutes a public use or service
that will justify the exercise of these sovereign powers over rights of prop-
erty this identity renders it unnecessary to distinguish between the two forms
of exercise as the same test must apply to and control in each." This limita-
tion does not apply, however, to the subject matter of taxation nor the motive
but only the disposition of the proceeds.
A resum6 of some of the cases in which the aid of these powers has been
invoked will serve to clarify their meaning. In Mutual Loan Co. v. Marlell,
225 U. S. 232, the Court passed upon an act of the Massachusetts legislature
invalidating the assignment of future wages without the consent of the wage-
earner's wife and employer. Against an objection that the exercise of the
police power, as this was admitted to be, must have for its purpose "some
clear, real and substantial connection with the preservation of the public
health, safety, morals or general welfare" the Court, in sustaining the statute,
said that the power "extends to so dealing with the conditions which exist in
the state as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of its people." In Bar-
bier v. Connolly (1885), 113 U. S. 27, 30-32, an ordinance of the City of San
Francisco prohibited the carrying on of washing and ironing of clothes in
public laundries and wash-houses within certain prescribed limits of the city
and county from io P. M. until 6 A. M. It was claimed that this amounted
to a deprivation of property under the Fourteenth Amendment. Field, J.,
says "the provision is purely a police regulation * * * It may be a necessary
measure of protection in a city composed largely of wooden buildings * * *
and of the necessity of such regulation the municipal body is the exclusive
judge."' In Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, i74 U. S. 96, the
legislature had passed a law allowing a reasonable attorney fee to successful
plaintiffs in actions against railroad companies for damage due to negligent
escape of fire. It was upheld on the ground that it was primarily for the
purpose of securing the utmost care on the part of the companies in the
performance of their duties? In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. II,
the Court upheld a statute requiring compulsory vaccination against smallpox,
in the discretion of the health authorities.
3 In the Lown Company case,
supra, the right of property was not directly involved even if one could be
said to have a property right in unearned wages. It was a straight question
" E.r parte Quong Wo. r61 Cal. 220.
2Accord: Seaboard Air Line v. Seegers, (1907) 207 U. S. 73, 77-79. Chicago, M.
"St. P. Ry. Co. v. Poll, 232 U. S. z65, contra. See also Henring v. Georgia, 163 U. S.
299, prohibiting running of freight trains on Sunday; Gilmnant v. Philadelphia, , Wall. 713
and Cardwell v. American Bridge Co., 113 U. S. 205. where the legislature was sustained
in its attempt to foster one public use at the expense of another; Charlotte C. & A. R.
Co. v. Gibbs, (1892) 142 U. S. 386, imposing on railway corporations alone the expense
of the State Railway Commission; Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, levy of
assessment on banks to provide reserve fund in case of bankruptcy of any bank: State
ex rel Yaple v. Creamer, 85 Ohio St. 394, providing for Workmen's Compensation by
general assessment of employees.
3 Laurel Hill Cemnetery v. City and County of San Francisco, 216 U. S. 358, prohibit-
ing burial of dead within city limits; People ex rel Barone v. Fox, r44 App. Div. 6ui,
medical treatment of prostitutes.
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of public morals and welfare. In the Connolly and Quong Wo cases, the
decision clearly rested on the ground of public safety. The Atchison case,
conceding the purpose to be as stated by the Court, finds like justification.
The Jacobson cae is based on the right to legislative with a view to the public
health. These cases are essentially different from such cases as City of Pas-
saic v. Patterson Bill Posting, Advertising and Sign Painting Co., 72 N. J.
L. 285, in that the former involve primarily, regulations of conduct while the
latter are aimed more directly against private property rights. In the Pat-
terson case, an ordinance provided that no sign or billboard should be more
than eight feet above the surface of the ground and not less than ten feet
from the street line. The Court says, "the fact that this ordinance is directed
against signs and billboards only and not against fences indicates that some
consideration other than the public safety led to its passage. It is probable
that the enactment was due rather to aesthetic considerations than to con-
siderations of public safety. * * * Aesthetic considerations are a matter of
luxury and it is necessity alone which justifies the exercise of the police power
to take private property without compensation." The Supreme Court of the
United States in Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U. S. 526, appar-
ently found a way to circumvent this objection. A statute prohibited the
erection of any billboard on any lot in any street in which one-half the build-
ings were used exclusively for residence purposes unless permission was
obtained in writing from a majority of the owners. The Court found that
such billboards were hiding places for criminals and upheld the law on the
ground that it came within the purview of the police power as a regulation
for the public safety. It is difficult to see why the same objection would not
apply in this case as served to restrain the court in the Passaic case, supra.
No reason is apparent why billboards should be any better for this purpose
than fences or other similar structures. As said in Crawford v. Topeka, 5I
Kan. 756, where an ordinance provided that no person should erect any bill-
board or other structure for advertising purposes unless placed at least a
distance exceeding five feet of the height of such signs from the sidewalk,
"All statutory restrictions of the use of property are imposed upon the
theory that they are necessary for the safety, health, or comfort. * * * In what
way can the erection of a safe structure for advertising purposes near the
front of a lot endanger public safety any more than a like structure for some
other lawful purpose." Equally good shelter is afforded by a fence without
a poster on it as one so decorated.
In all of these cases the real legislative intent as seen by the courts was
not the apparent or express intent. An interesting case arose in Massachu-
setts, Commonwealth v. Boston Adv. Co., 188 Mass. 348, in which Ahe legis-
lature had passed a law prohibiting the display of signs so that they might
be seen from Revere Beach Park Way in Boston. Here, avowedly, the pur-
pose was to cater to the aesthetic. In declaring this statute invalid, the Court
says, "We agree that the promotion of the pleasure of the people is a public
purpose for which public money may be 'used and taxes laid even if the
pleasure is secured merely by delighting one of the senses * * * The question
here is not of the power of the state to expend money or to lay taxes, to
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promote aesthetic ends or to regulate the use of property with a view to
promote such ends. It is of the right of the state by such regulations to
deprive the owner of property of a natural use of that property without
giving compensation for the resulting loss to the owner."' A rather broad
distinction is taken between the powers of taxation and eminent domain and
the police power in that the latter cannot be used to infringe on property
rights unless a clear necessity exists, while taxation and eminent domain
need only be for a public use. One way of eliminating this rather artificial
distinction would be to concede the right to exercise the police power with
compensation in those border line cases where any real distinction" is well
nigh impossible. Again in Bostick v. Sams (902), 95 Md. 4o2, the question
came before the courts. The City of Baltimore, by an ordinance provided
that no permits should be granted for buildings in certain portions of the city
unless they should in the judgment of the Judge of the Appeal Tax Court,
conform to the general character of the buildings previously erected in the
same locality and did not impair the value of surrounding property. A per-
mit was requested for a building to house a circus. The Court held that,
aside from the use to which the building was to be put, an independent ques-
tion, a general grant of municipal police power and charter provisions author-
izing regulations to guard against constructions of buildings so as to be un-
safe, inflamable, offensive, deleterious to health, dangerous to life, limb or
4 Accord: People v. Green, 83 N. Y. S. 460.
Attempts to regulate billboard and other advertising have been made by the follow-
ing states:
Conn. X915, c. 314, p. a179. Licenses for advertisements. Held constitutional in
State v. Murphy, 98 At]. 343.
Ill. 19o9, p. 139. Cities, villages and towns to license and regulate advertising,
billboards, etc.
Md. 1914, C. 824, p. 1554, at 1557, (Roadside Tree Law) Prohibits advertisements
and billboards along public roads.
Mass. 1903, c. 158, p. sx. Metropolitan Park Commission given power to prohibit
erection of any advertising device which should be plainly visihle to persons passing
along the parkway. See Commonwealth v. Boston Advertising Co., .88 Mass. 348.
Id. 1915, c. 176, p. 157. Regulating signs, awnings and other projections in public
ways.
Mass. Constitution, Article of Amendment, No. 3. "Advertising on public ways, inr
public places and on private property within public view may be regulated and restricted
by law," Ratified Nov. s, 1918.
N. J. x898, p. 836, sec. 152. Misdemeanor to place advertisement on Hudson River
Palisades. Held unconstitutional in State v. Lamb, 98 AtI. 459.
Ohio. Constitutional Amendment, Art. XV, sec. ii, regulating use of billboards.
Defeated September 3, 1912. Ohio is said to be the first state to attempt billboard regu-
lation by constitutional provision.
R. ". 1910, c. 542. Cities and towns to regulate out-door advertising. Held valid
in Gilmartin v. Standish-Barnes, 40 R. I. 259.
Id. 1914, c. 1075, p. 133. Forbids billboards near railroad crossings and inter-
sections of highways.
Great Britain. 1907, C. 27, p. xx6. (Advertisements Regulation Act). "2. (2) Any
local authority may make byelaws * * * For regulating, restricting or preventing the
exhibition of advertisements in such places and in such manner, or by such means. as to
affect injuriously the amenities of a public park or pleasure promenade, or to disfigure
the natural beauty of a landscape."
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property did not authorize, such provisions as the above. These so-called
zoning laws have been enacted by a numbrer of states.! The outstanding
feature of these cases seems to be that no court has yet accorded to any state
or local government the right to impair private property rights by the use of
the police power for aesthetic purposes. In the field of eminent domain a
greater latitude is allowed. Such cases as United States v. Gettysburg EL.
R. Co., i6o U. S. 668 and Attorney General v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476, have
now firmly established the right of the government to condemn land for public
parks. 20 HAxv. L. Rzv. 35. Not every public purpose, however, will warrant
its use. In Opinion of the Justices, 211 Mass. 624, the Court held unconstitu-
tional a law providing in effect that the state might purchase, develop, build
upon, rent, manage, sell and repurchase land. Nor in the Opinion of the
Justices, 204 Mass. 607 could the City of Boston, under a general power of
eminent domain, acquire property for the purpose of replatting certain por-
tions of the city though this would undoubtedly facilitate traffic and was the
only feasible method. The difficulty here was the absence of any real public
use. No direct benefit accrued to the public as in the case of Attorney Gen-
eral v. Willams, supra, where ihe actual enjoyment of the park was greatly
enhanced by restricting the height of surrounding buildings. In his zeal to
sustain the Minnesota law, a reviewer of the instant case in the MINNESOTA
LAW RZVIXw, suggests that the streets in the restricted district be put under
the jurisdiction of the park board and thereby bring the case within the
decision of Attortey General v. Williams. However it is doubtful if the
courts would consider such a proceeding anything more than a mere subter-
fuge except in those cases where the streets really merited such classification
as in the case of public drives and boulevards and even then the Williams
case would hardly apply since the real objection in the instant case is not so
much to the character and style of the building as to the fact that it is an
apartment house. Such courts as tend toward a liberal interpretation of the
law with possibly a greater regard for progressive welfare than a strict ad-
herence to judicial precedent and functions can find justification for such
decisions as this one in the field of eminent domain but it can hardly be suc-
cessfully disputed that it is a distinct departure from any previously decided
case and inaugurates the rather broad and general principle that a public
purpose as distinguished from a public use may serve as a basis for the
exercise of the right of eminent domain.!
A. B. T.
5 Zoning laws: Calif., 1917, C. 734, P. 1419; Ill., 1919, p. 262; La., '918, act. 27, p. 35;
Mass. Const., Art. of Amendment No. 13, approved Nov. 5, 191S, Minn., 1915, C. 128,
p. 18o; Neb., 1919, c. x85, p. 417; N. J., 1917, C. 54, P. 94; N. Y., 1917, c. 483, p. 1463;
Oreg., 1919, c. 300, p. 539. Reprinted by permission, from LoosE LEAF INDEX To LEGIS-
LATION. October, 1919.
OAs to the analogous subject of Excess Condemnation see the following laws: Calif.,
Const., Art XI, Proposed amendment by adding see. 2o. See 1913, c. 6., p. 074. Re-
jected Nov. 3, 1914; 1915, C. 45, P. x864. -Rejected Oct. 26, 1g5; 1917, c. 49, P. 1938. Re-
jected Nov. 5, 1918. Conit., 1907, Special laws, p. 44, sec. 7. (Hartford). Haw., 1919,
act 170, p. 230. Ind., 1919, C. 144, p. 639. See secs. 8 and zo. Mass., 1904, c. A43, P.
434. Const., Art. X, Pt. I, amended by Art. XXXIX. See 1910, p. 875: 1911, C. 91, P.
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ATORNY'S LZN FOR SEaVICs-SSr-oF oP JUDGMENTs.-Anglo-Saxon
judges, as members of the legal profession, have shown an admirable freedom
from professional bias and class selfishness in dealing with questions involv-
ing the rights and privileges of members of their profession. With every
opportunity offered for treating lawyers as a favored class, they have been
able to maintain a detached and objective attitude toward them. Indeed, the
courts seem to have preferred to be charged with excessive severity in deal-
ing with their brethren of the bar rather than give the slightest ground for
suspicion that they were capitalizing their power in the interest of the legal
fraternity.
A familiar example of the struggle to do absolute justice in regard to
professional claims occurs in connection with the attorney's charging lien
for services, and a recent case in the New York Court of Appeals presents
an interesting application of the problem. Beecher v. Peter A. Vogt Mfg. Co.
(N. Y., 192o) 125 N. E. 831. In this case the Vogt Company recovered a
judgment against Beecher and Smith, and thereupon Beecher and Smith
undertook to use a judgment against the Vogt Company which they had
obtained by assignment, as a set-off against this obligation. The Vogt Com-
pany was insolvent, and the attorneys for that company, who had not been
paid for their services in obtaining the judgment, claimed, a lien on the
judgment superior to the set-off. And the question was, whether the whole
of the Vogt judgment against Beecher and Smith could be neutralized by
the set-off of the cross judgment, or only the balance over and above the lien
held by the attorneys who obtained it for the Vogt Company.
As an abstract question of right, it seems unreasonable to hold that the
lien of the attorney should depend, and more than other liens depend, upon
the subsequent conduct of other persons. If the attorney has a valid claim
upon a judgment for his fees and expenses, why should this claim be de-
stroyed without his consent or participation? This view was stated and
adopted by the Court of King's Bench in i79i in the case of Mitchell v.
1076. Approved Nov. 7, 1911, 1912, C. 715, sec. 1o, p. 792, declared unconstitutional in
Salisbury L. & I. Co. v. Massachusetts, 215 Mass. 371, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) iz96. Ibid.,
1914, P. 1057, resolution to amend passed senate and house 1914. To be submitted to
legislature of 19t5. (No further record). N. J., Const., Art. IV, sec. 9, amendment re-
jected Oct. 19, 1914. 1915 Sp. C. 2, p. 894. N. Y., Const., Art. I, amendment sees. 6 and
7. Sec. 1910, V. 2, p. 2049: 1911, V. 3, appendix p. 4: 1912, V. 2, p. 1381: 19T3, V. 3,
P. 2224: 1913, V. 4, P. 2491. Adopted Nov. 4, 1913. See 1914, v. 3, P. 2371. Pro.
posed amendment to the same section, 1917, v. 3, P. 2783: 1918, V. 3, P. 2083: 1919 V. 2, p.
1789. To be submitted to people at general election, 1919. Ibid., 1914, v. 2, c. 300, p.
864 (Syracuse); rgzr, v. 3, C. 593, P. 1825 (New York City). Repealed by 1915, v. 3, C.
6o6. Re-enacted i9x6, c. 112, p. 268. Ohio, 1904, p. 333. (See sec. 10-12th). Const.,
Art., XVIII, sec. io, amendment adopted Sept. 3, 1912. Pa., 1907, No. 315, p. 466. Un-
constitutional. See Pennsylvania Mut. L. I,r. Co. v. Philadelphia, 242 Pa. 47. Const.,
Art. XVIII, sec. x6. x9z5, p. 110s. To be submitted to the legislature of 1917. Oreg.,
193, C. 269, p. 5o8. R. h, Const., Art. XVII, sec. I, amendment adopted Nov. 7, 1916.
Va., i9o6, c. 194, P. 317. Code Supp. 19xo, p. 66r. Wash., 1919, c. 135, p. 382, [Park
(Metropolitan) Districts Act.] Wis., Const., Art. XI, amendment sec. 3a; 19o9 p. 831:
19!1, p. 1121, id., c. 665, p. sogo. Adopted Nov. 5, 1912. Const., Art. XI, amendment
see. 3b: 1911, p. 1114: 1913, p. 1374: id. c. 770, p. 1209, at 1213. Defeated Nov. 3, 1914.
Reprinted by permission from LoosE LEAP INDEX To LEGISLATION, October, 1919.
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Oldfield, 4 T. R. 123. But in 1795, jhe Court of Common Pleas, in Vaughan
v. Davies, 2 H. B1. 440, without any discussion, held that the attorney's lien
could not be allowed to prevent a party from having the full benefit of his
set-off. Four years later, in Hall v. Ody, 2 Bos. & Pul. 28, the Vaughan Case
was followed with evident reluctance as the "settled practice" of the court,
Lord Eldon remarking, "I find it to be the settled practice with much surprise,
since it stands in a direct contradiction to the practice of every other
court as well as to the principles of justice." But Rook. J., steeling his heart
against his legal brethren, thought it was fair enough, since "the attorney
looks in the first instance to the personal security of his client, and if beyond
that he can get any further security into his hands, it is a mere casual advan-
tage." Lord Eldon was wrong, however, in the statement just quoted, as
applied to the Court of Chancery, which, while not free from inconsistencies,
seemed to follow the rule of the Common Pleas rather than that of the
King's Bench. Wright v. Mudie, I Sim. & S. 226; Mohawk Bank v. Burrows,
6 John C. (N.Y.) 317. The same difficulty arose in the Court of Exchequer,
and it was pointed out in Lane v. Pearse, 12 Price 742, that the practice of
that court had been confused with contradictory decisions, but on the merits
the judges were inclined to follow the hard rule of the Common Pleas.
The controversy was finally settled by the Rules of Hilary Term, 1832,
(Rule 93) providing that the attorney's lien should not be prejudiced by the
set-off of a judgment in a different suit, and this doctrine is still follow.'d
under the current English Rules and Orders. David v. Rees, [1904] 2 K. B.
435.
Some of this English judicial history is referred to by the New York
Court of Appeals in the case above cited, and the further history of the con-
troversy as it persisted in the early New York decisions, is presented; with
the result, however, that the court was able to absolve itself from respon-
sibility for choosing the true rule to be followed by concluding that the
attorney's lien had been given the same standing by statute as an equitable
assignment of the cause of action or judgment, and as such it was superior
to the claim of the set-off.
The prevailing rule in the United States, where the matter is not regu-
lated by statute, recognizes the superior claim of the attorney's lien, thus fol-
lowing the present English practice: Leavenson v. Lafontane, 3 Kan. 523;
Ward v. Watson, 27 Neb. 768; Phillips v. MacKay, 54 N. J. L. 319 (fully
discussing the history and the merits of the question) ; Diehl v. Friester,
37 Ohio St. 473; Pirie v. Harkness, 3 S. D. 178; Roberts v. Mitchell, 94 Tenn.
277 (a well considered case) ; Currier v. Boston & Maine RR. Co., 37 N. H.
223; Renick v. Ludington, 16 W. Va. 378; Carter v. Davis, 8 Fla. 183; Stanley
v. Bouck, 107 Wis. 225. In many jurisdictions the legislature has come to the
assistance of the attorney and expressly given his lien for services priority
over executions issued on judgments employed by way of set-off: Brent v.
Brent, 24 Ill. App. 448; Adams v. Lee, 82 Ind. 587; Stone v. Hyde,
22 Me. 318. But the old rule of the English Common Pleas is still adhered
to in some states,--in a few as a principle appealing to the conscience or
conservatism of the court, as in McDonald v. Smith, 57 Vt. 502, -but more
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commonly because the legislature has taken the view that the attorney who
secured the judgment is entitled to no equity superior to that of his client,
and if his client's interest in the judgment is subject to the. set-off of another
judgment, then the lien of the attorney falls with it: Lindholn v. Itasca
Lumber Co., 64 Minn. 46; Langston v. Roby, 68 Ga. 406; Hurst v. Sheets, 21
Ia. 5o; Ex parte Lehman, 59 Ala. 631. E. R. S.
INTERNATIONAL REcoGNITION AND THE NATIONAL COURTS.-In the lawv of
nations everything depends upon recognition. A newly organized state may
possess all the requisites of de facto existence, but it can gain admission to
the community of international law only as it is recognized by other states.
Even after it has been admitted to the international community it may be
virtually outlawed by the refusal of other states to recognize a change in its
government. It is through recognition and recognition alone that a de facto
state becomes and continues an international person and a subject of inter-
national law. See BONFILS, MANUEL, [5th ed.], sec. 199; OPPENHEIM, INT.
LAW, 2 ed., I, sec. 71; WHEATON, INT. LAW, [Lawrence's 2 ed.], p. 38.
Theoretically, perhaps, it may be said that as soon as a de facto state comes
into existence it enters ipso facto into the international community. See
HALL, INT. LAW, [7th ed.] secs. 2, 26; RIviER, PRINCiPES, I, 57; ULLMANN,
VOLKERRECEIT, sec. 30. But practically it is everywhere admitted that recog-
nition is a prerequisite to the normal and effective exercise of international
rights. Moreover, the granting or denial of recognition is within the dis-
cretion of each state. Theoretically, it may be urged that a new state or
government has a legal right to be recognized and consequently that there is a
legal duty of recognition. See BLUNTSCHLI, VOLKERRECHT, secs. 3, 35; HALL,
INT. LAW, [7th ed.], secs, 2, 26. But as a practical matter it is generally
conceded that there is nothing in the custom of nations which supports the
affirmation of such a duty. See BONPILS, MANUEL, [5th ed.], secs. 2oo, 2O1;
OPPENHEIM, INT. LAW, [2 ed.], I, 71. Cf. NYs, in RzvuS DE DROIT INTERN.,-
TIONAL, 2e., s&r., V, 294; PRADIER-FDERE, TRAITE, I, sec. 1114. "The decision
of each individual state, on the vital point of recognition, is thus not only
technically and formally, but in the majority of cases, really final. It cannot
be called in question even diplomatically, as may be done with the judgment
of a prize court; because, previous to recognition, there are no .diplomatic
relations between political communities. The judgment of the individual
state can thus be disputed only %4 et armis; and this judgment, be it re-
marked, extends not only to the facts, but to the law by which these facts
are to be measured. Each state is to say, not only whether or not a given
community fulfills the requirements of international existence, but is, more-
over, left to determine what these requirements are." LORIMER, INSTITUTES
o1 LAW ov NATIONS, I, 107.
The principle that international personality depends upon recognition
has important consequences in our national law. "International law is part
of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of jus-
tice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon
it are duly presented for their determination." The Paquette Habana, (igoo)
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175 U. S. 677, 700. Sec. i7 MICH. L. Rtv.. i69. If the case turns upon the
existence of a foreign community, government, or state, the international
rule will be ascertained and applied by the courts only when the community,
government, or state in question has been recognized by the appropriate
department of our government. Thus, if the application of the rule depends
upon the insurgency of a foreign community, the rule will be applied only
if insurgency has been recognized. The Three Friends, (1897) II6 U. S. 1.
See also The Happy Couple, (i8o5) Stewart 65; The Manilta, (18o8) Edw.
Adm. I; The Pelican, (i8o9) Edw. Adm., App. D. Similarly, if the applica-
tion of the rule depends upon the belligerency of a foreign community, the
status of belligerency must have been recognized. See United States v.
Palmer, (1818) 3 Wh. 6io, 634; The Divina Pastora, (i8f9) 4 Wh. 52, 63;
The Neuva Anna, (1821) 6 Wh. 193. If the case turns upon the existence
of a foreign government recognition will be decisive. See Thompson v.
Powles, (1828) 2 Sim. 194, 212; Taylor v. Barclay, (1828) 2 Sim. 213; Re-
public of Peru v. Dreyfus Brothers, (888) L. R. 38 Ch. D. 348. For illus-
tration, injuries to citizens or subjects by acts done in a foreign country
became damnum absque injuria after recognition has conceded retroactively
that the acts were done in the exercise of governmental authority. Underhill
v. Hernandez, (1897) i68 U. S. 25o. And the seizure of property in a foreign
country cannot be questioned in the courts after recognition has conceded
retroactively that the seizure was done in the exercise of governmental
authority. Oetien v. Central Leather Co., (igi) 246 U. S. 297; Ricaud v.
American Metal Co., (i918) 246 U. S. 304. A foreign state may maintain
an action in the courts. The Sapphire, (1870) ii Wall. 164; United States of
America v. Wagner, (1867) L. R. 2 Ch. App. 582. But of course no action
can be maintained if the government of the state has not been recognized.
City of Berne v. Bank of England, (804) 9 Ves. 347; Dolder v. Bank of
England, (18o5) io Ves. 352. Eextensive immunities from jurisdiction are
accorded the agents and instrumentalities of a foreign state, such as the
immunity of a foreign sovereign, De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, (185i) 20
L. J. Q. B. 488; Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, [1894] 1 Q. B. i49; the im-
munity of diplomatic representatives, Parkinson v. Potter, (885) L. R. 16
Q. B. 152; Macartney v. Garbutt, (89o) L. R. 24 Q. B. 368; Wilson v.
Blanco, (1889) 556 N. Y. 582; 17 MICH. L. Rv. 424; the immunity of public
agents in respect of acts done under the authority of their own state, Duke
of Brunswick v. King of Hanovor, (1848) 2 H. L. C. I; Hatch v. Baez, (1876)
7 Hun. 596;. Underhill v. Hernandez, supra; the immunity of ships of war,
The Constitution, (1879) 4 P. D. 39; Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,
(1812) 7 Cr. 116; the immunity of other ships in the service of the state,
The Parliament Beige, (i88o) L. R. 5 P. D. 197; The Jassy, L. R. [igo6] P.
270; 17 MIcH. L. Rv. 425; and the immunity of property of the state, Vavas-
seur v. Krupp, (1878) L. R. 9 Ch. D. 351; Mason v. Intercolonial Railway of
Canada, (19o8) 197 Mass. 349. Recognition is of course a prerequisite to the
enjoyment of the above immunities. It is unnecessary to multiply illustra-
tions. The rules of international law will be administered by our courts in
a great variety of circumstances if the foreign community or state involved
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has been invested with international personality by the magic act of recog-
nition.
Since the act of recognition is essentially an act of discretion or policy
it belongs naturally to the political departments of government and par-
ticularly to the department in charge of foreign affairs. It belongs exclusively
to the political departments of government. "And if we undertook to inquire
whether she (Texas) had not in fact become an independent sovereign state
before she was recognized as such by the treaty-making power, we would
take upon ourselves the exercise of political authority, for which a judicial
tribunal is wholly unfit, and which the Constitution has conferred exclusively
upon another department." Kennett v. Chambers, (1852) 14 How. 38, so.
It is primarily an executive function. See P4NV=ID, in 32 Am. L. Rzv. 39o,
392. The decision -of the political department is conclusive for the courts.
"So soon as it is shewn that a de facto government of a foreign state has been
recognized by the government of this country, no further inquiry is permitted
in a Court of Justice here. The Court declines to investigate, and indeed
has no proper means of investigating, the title of actual government of a
foreign state which has been thus recognized." Republic of Peru v. Peruvian
Guano Co., (1887) L. R. 36 Ch. D. 489, 497. See also Emperor of Austria v.
Day, (i86i) 3 De G., F., & J. 217, 221, 233; Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, [1894]
I Q. B. i49, 158, 16o, 161; Clark v. United States, (8ii) 5 Fed. Cas. 932;
Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Co., (1839) X3 Pet. 415, 42o; The Hornet,
(187o) 12 Fed. Cas. 529; Oetien, v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297, 302;
Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U. S. 3o4, 3o8. The courts simply do not
take cognizance of an unrecognized state or government. See Thompson v.
Powles, supra; Taylor v. Barclay, supra; City of Berne v. Bank of England,
supra; Jones v. Garcia del Rio, (1823) Tur. & Rus. 297, 299; Rose v. Himely,
(18o8) 4 Cr. 241, 272; Gelston v. Hoyt, (1818) 3 Wh. 246, 324; United States
v. Palmer, supra; The Divina Pastora, supra; Kennett v. Chambers, supra:
PHILLIMORZ, COMMENTARIES UPON INT. LAW, [3 ed.], II, 37; PMDELIMVRE.
PaClS, I, sec. 122. If it becomes necessary for the court to know whether
or not an alleged community, government, or state has been recognized by
the political department, and there is no controlling proclamation, treaty, or
executive action of which the court may take judicial notice, the appropriate
method of ascertaining the fact is by direct communication with the political
department. There are a few dicta which suggest that it might be permissible
to prove the existence of an unrecognized community, government, or state
in certain circumstances. See Yrisarri v. Clement, (1826) 3 Bing. 432, 438;
Consul of Spain v. The Conception, (i81) 6 Fed. Cas. 359. And in the case
of The Charkieh, (1873) L. R. 4 A. & E. 59, the court entered into an ex-
haustive inquiry into the status of the Khedive of Egypt, although informed
by the Foreign Office that the Khedive had not been recognized. This method
was emphatically disapproved, however, in Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, supra,
and it may be taken for granted in England today that when in doubt the
court will always communicate with the political department and will treat
that department's reply as conclusive. See also Taylor v. Barclay, supra;
Foster v. Globe Venture Syndicate, (igoo) 69 L. J. Ch. 375; The Gagara,
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(i919) 88 L. J. P. ioi; The Annette, (i919) 88 L. J. P. 107. It is thought
that a similar method would be followed in the United States. See Ex parte
Hits, (1884) 111 U. S. 766; In re Bai, (1889) i35 U. S. 403, 431; Underhill v.
Hernandes, supra; U. S. FoR. RIL., 1892, p. 644.
The complete subordination of the judiciary to the political departments
in the matter of international recognition is well illustrated by two recent
cases in the English Court of Admiralty. In the case of The Gagara, a Rus-
sian merchant ship was taken over by the Bolshevik Government under a
decree declaring the mercantile fleet national property, repaired and loaded
with a cargo of wood, and sent on a commerical voyage to Copenhagen. 
It
was seized and condemned by the Esthonian Government as prize of war. It
was then registered as belonging to the Esthonian Republic, placed in charge
of a master and crew appointed by the Provisional Government of Esthonia,
and directed to London, where it was arrested on behalf of the former 
Rus-
sian owners. In the case of The Annette and The Dora, Russian 
merchant
ships were requisitioned by the Provisional Government of Northern 
Russia,
with headquarters at Archangel, and were turned over to a Russian 
Co-
operative Association to be used in trading under the control of 
the Pro-
visional Government's Director of Naval Transports. The vessels 
were sent
with cargoes of tar to Liverpool, where they were arrested 
on behalf of
former Russian owners. In each case an appearance was entered under pro-
test and a motion made to set aside the writ on the ground that the vessel
was immune from arrest because it belonged to and was in the service of the
government of a friendly state. Tn each case the Court addressed an inquiry
to the Foreign Office in regard to the status of the provisional 
government
concerned. As regards Esthonia, it was replied that Great Britain 
had "for
the time being, provisionally and with all necessary reservations as 
to the
future, recognized the Esthonian National Council as a de facto independent
body," and accordingly had "received certain gentlemen as informal 
diplomatic
representatives of the Esthonian Provisional Government." It was also 
stated
on behalf of the Attorney General that "in the present view of His 
Majesty's
Government, and without in any way binding itself as to the 
future, the
Esthonian Government is such a Government as could, if it thought 
fit, set up
a Prize Court." As regards the Provisional Government at Archangel, 
the
Foreign Office replied in part as follows: "the Provisional Government 
of
Northern Russia is composed of Russian groups who do not recognize 
the
authority of the Russian Central Soviet Government established at Moscow.
The seat of the government is Archangel, and it extends its authority 
over
the territory surrounding that port, and to the west of the White 
Sea up to
the Finnish frontier. As the title assumed by that government 
indicates, it
is merely provisional in nature, and has not been formally recognized 
either
by His Majesty's Government or by the Allied Powers as 
the government
of a sovereign independent state. His Majesty's Government and the 
Allied
Powers are, however, at the present .moment co-operating with the 
Provis-
ional Government in the opposition which that government is making 
to the
forces of the Russian Soviet Government, who are engaged in aggressive
military operations against it, and are represented at Archangel by a 
British
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commissioner. The representative of the Provisional Government in London
is Monsieur Nabokoff, through whom His Majesty's Government conduct
communication with the Archangel Provisional Government." In the case
of The Garaga, it was held that the Esthonian National Council had been
recognized and that the writ should be set aside. Affirmed in the Court of
Appeal, (igig) 88 L. J. P. ior. In the case of The Annette and The Dora,
it was held that the Provisional Government at Archangel had not been
recognized, that in any event it was not in possession of the vesgels, and
accordingly that the writs should not be set aside. Admiralty, (i919) 88
L. J. P. io7.
It may well be regretted that in such a vital matter as international
recognition the courts are restricted to the trivial function of construing com-
munications solicited from the department in charge of foreign affairs. The
restriction can hardly be escaped, however, as governments are now con-
stituted. The courts themselves have indicated at least three reasons for this
conclusion: in the first place, the courts are not equipped to decide a question
of this nature, Republic of Peru v. Peruvian Guano Co., supra; Kennett v.
Chambers, supra; PNFI4r1,D, in 32 Am. L. Rlv. 390, 406; secondly, sound policy
requires that the courts act in unison with the other departments of govern-
ment in matters involving foreign relations, Foster v. Globe Venture Syndicate,
supra; The Hornet, supra; and thirdly, the conduct of foreign relations is
vested exclusively under the Constitution in Other departments of the gov-
ernment, United States v. Palnter, supra; Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Co.,
supra; Kennett v. Chambers, mpra; Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., supra.
It would seem, nevertheless, that international recognition ought on prin-
ciple to be determined in a proceeding of a judicial nature. International law
may properly define the elements essential to international personality; but
if the existence of these elements can be established, recognition ought to
follow as a matter of course. Moreover, it would be a great advantage if
recognition could be of general effect for all members of the international
community. The national courts are not available. Why not an international
jurisdiction? Why not make it possible for each community claiming recog-
nition to have its rights determined by a tribunal constituted at The Hague
from the panel of the so-called Permanent Court of Arbitration? If a real
permanent court should be established under the League of Nations, why not
invest it with jurisdiction to hear and determine claims to recognition? The
suggestion may be regarded as somewhat utopian, but no more so, certainly,
than many another that has received serious consideration of late. Such a
reform, if it could be achieved, would be a great advance in the struggle to
rescue international law from the confusion and intrigue of diplomacy.
E. D. D.
CONSTITTIONALITY OP SOLDIERS' BONUS LAw.-The recent case of State
ex rel Atwood v. Johnson. 175 N. W. 589, decided by the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin November 17, I919, presents a question of peculiar interest at the
present time.
On July 30, 1919, the legislature of Wisconsin passed the Soldiers' Bonus
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Act, which was approved by a majority of the electors of the state on Sep-
tember 2, igig. , (Laws of igi, sec. 667). The act provides for the payment
of a "bonus" as a token "of the appreciation of the character and spirit of
the patriotic services of the soldiers, sailors, marines and nurses who served
in the armed forces of the United States during the war with Germany and
Austria." The bonus is payable only to those of the classes named who
were residents of Wisconsin at the time of induction into service. The act
is applicable to drafted as well as enlisted men. The amount of benefits
to each is determined largely by the length of service, there being, a payment
of ten dollars for each month's service, with a minimum of fifty dollars.
The act provides that the money is to be raised by a surtax on incomes and
by a special tax on property. The amount of the property tax, within prescribed
limits is left to the determination of the service recognition board, provided
for by the act. In proceedings brought to test the constitutionality of the
act it was held that the act was valid.
Several objections were urged against the validity of this act. The main
ground relied upon by the contestants was that the taxation provided for is
for a purpose not public. It is a well recognized principle of the law that
the purpose of a tax must be public. The leading case on this subject is
Loan Association v. Topeka, 2o Wall. 655, decided by the United States Su-
preme Court in 1874. See also Perry v. Keene, 56 N. H. 514. "A tax being
in the eyes of the law an enforced contribution upon persons or property to
raise money for a public purpose it follows that where this public purpose
is absent, the contribution sought to be enforced cannot be justified as a
tax but amounts to an attempt to take property without due process of law."
I WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONS, 585,
There seems to be a distinction, in considering what is a public purpose,
between Federal, State and Municipal laws. This distinction is recognized in
5 HAL L. RIv. 336. The distinction is also noted by Judge Cooley in his work
on TAXATION, [2nd ed.) page io8, in which he says, "There may, therefore,
be a public purpose, as regards the Federal Union, which may not be such as
a basis for state taxation, and there may be a public purpose which upholds
state taxation but not taxes which its municipalities would be at liberty to
vote and collect." As the principal case confines itself necessarily to state
taxation, no consideration will be noticed here concerning any similar federal
taxation.
There are certain purposes for which taxes are levied which are clearly
and manifestly public, as for example, taxation for highways. There are
also cases in which there is a public expenditure with incidental private ad-
vantages. Taxation for assistance in constructing railroads presents a case
of this type. Perry v. Keene, supra. But all taxation is not as free from the
alloy of private interest as the railroad cases. The difficult case is that of
an expenditure for the direct benefit of individuals with an incidental public
gain. Can we say that the Soldier's Bonus Law falls into this class? Is a
token "of appreciation of the character and spirit of patriotic services" a
public purpose?
When this question is considered in view of the previous cases involving
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"bounties" it appears that the purpose is manifestly private and not public.
Judge Cooley in People v. Salen, 20 Mich. 452, said, "A bounty law of which
this is the real nature is void, whatever may be the pretence on which it may
be enacted"-This is undoubtedly the weight of authority on questions in-
volving bounties, or as Judge Cooley said--" of which this is the real nature."
See Feldinan v. City. Council, 23 S. C. 57; Weismer v. Douglas, 64 N. Y. 91;
People v. Salem, supra; Attorney General v. Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400. It
will be noticed that the case of Attorney General v. Eau Claire, supra, was de-
cided by the same court that decided the principal case. This court immediately
after the close of the Civil War expressly held that raising money to pay
bounties to volunteers was a public purpose. Broadhead v. Milwaukee, I9
Wis. 658. The Wisconsin court therefore has recognized a clear distinction
betwen the ordinary case of a "bounty" and "a bounty to soldiers." If there
is such distinction to what can it be -due? Can it be said that the court
had in mind a consideration of public policy? This is hardly a satisfactory
legal explanation. Possibly we might say that the "real nature" of such a
purpose is not that of a bounty. Thai raising money as a bonus for soldiers
is a public purpose has been recognized in other cases. Trustees of Cass
Township v. Dillon, 16 Ohio St. 38; State ex rel Garrett v. Froelich, I18
Wis. I29; McCurdy v. Tappan, 29 Wis. 664; United States v. Hosmer, 9 Wall.
432; Opinion of the Justices, 211 Mass. 6o8. See also 14 L. R. A. 474.
It is to be noticed in the case mentioned above that the bounties were
paid to volunteers. In that respect those cases differ from the principal
case. Some of the decisions make a distinction between future and past
enlistments, holding that the payment of bounties to persons who have already
enlisted in the service, without any contract for such bounties is not use of
money for public purposes as there is no consideration therefor-Fowler v.
Danver, 8 Allen 8o; Shackford v. Newington, 46 N. H. 415; Crowde v. Hop-
kinton, 45 N. H. 9. However the bounties were held applicable to past as
well as future enlistments in Trustees of Cass Township v. Dillon, supra:
United States v. Hosmer, supra; Opinion of the Justices, supra. The basis
of such distinction seems to rest upon the supposed contract relation between
the state and the one who enlists in the service with the bonus in view. But this
difference can hardly be said to affect the validity of the legislative act for
if the act was unconstitutional no contract existed. The distinction there-
fore seems to be without foundation.
The purpose for which taxes are levied must be primarily and directly
for the public good. Lowell v. Boston, iir Mass. 454. It can not be doubted
that whether the object of a law is public or private is a judicial question
and not within legislative discretion. However every presumption is in favor
of the validity of such law. As the Wisconsin court expressed it in Broad-
head v. Milwaukee, supra, "To justify the court in arresting the proceedings
and declaring the tax void the absence of all possible public interest in the
purpose for which the funds are raised must be clear and palpable to every
reasonable mind." Is there an absence of "all public interest" in a question
such as is presented in the principal case? Such a statute may encourage
greatly the volunteer spirit, or the spirit of service in the future. It may
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lead to truer patriotism in the future. The "general welfare" of the state
and the country may be greatly secured and advanced. As the act declares
"of the appreciation of the character and spirit of the patriotic service."
Clearly this means the appreciation of the people of Wisconsin. The legis-
lature must have intended that the showing of such "appreciation" would
promote the general public good of the state. Surely it can not be said that
there is an "absence of all possible public interest." On the contrary the
public interest is apparent. Futhermore it would seem to be within the
power of the Wisconsin legislature to determine whether claims upon the
state are founded upon moral and honorable obligation and upon principles
of right and justice. See United States v. Realty Co., 163 U. S. 427. In other
words, this act may be viewed in the light of a payment for past services done
for and in behalf of the state. Is a definite, binding contract necessary in
the first instance for the legislative body to provide ways for meeting such
obligations? Clearly not. There are numerous acts of the legislature vali-
dating unenforceable contracts with the state or providing for payment of
services previously rendered. Can it not then be said that the state of
Wisconsin merely determined that these claims, if such they can be called,
are founded "upon moral and honorable obligation and upon principles of
right and justice?" Given a public object for which to tax the extent and
circumstances of any particular expenditures are matters of legislative
discretion, and if exercised to the undue benefit of private persons the remedy
is political. Lowell v. Boston, supra; People v. Salem, supra. It seems,
then, that the court in the principal case were correct in holding that upon
authority and principle the object of this tax was public and not private.
It will be noticed that most of the cases cited above refer expressly to
volunteers and do not include drafted men. However in Kentucky it was
held that an act authorizing money to be raised as bounties for volunteers in
anticipation of a draft was not constitutional as to those whom a draft would
not affect. Perguson v. Laudram, i Bush 548, 5 Bush 230. Furthermore in
view of the immediate policy of our government in inaugurating the selective
draft system without depending upon volunteers, the similar treatment of
all forces, regardless of the manner in which they entered the service, the
mingling in the same units of enlisted and drafted men, the same remuner-
ations in salaries and the Federal bonus, it can hardly be understood how,
in the face of such a definite military policy, a discrimination could be made
against the drafted man.
Another objection raised to the validity of this act was that legislative
power was unlawfully delegated to the board, in violation of the Constitu-
tion. The Court was undoubtedly justified in ruling that such was not a
delegation of legislative powers, as the duties of the board are purely minis-
terial. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 55 L. Ed. 563; Trustees of
Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas Co., 191 N. Y. 123, I8 L. R. A. (N.S.)
713.
For a recent case in accord with the principal case see Gustafson v. Rhin-
ow, i75 N. W. 903, decided by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, January 9,
192. B. B. M.
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LiAILrrY or CHARITABLE HOSPITALS rOR NEL1GrNC or TH1m E MPLOYEES.
-Recent decisions in a few jurisdictions have cast some doubt upon the doc-
trine, supported by the great weight of authority in this country, which ex-
empts a charitable hospital from liability for the negligent acts of its doctors
and nurses, if it has not been negligent in selecting them and does not retain
them after it has knowledge of their incapacity. In the case of Mulliner v.
Evangelisher Diakonniessenverein of Minnesota District of German Evangel-
ical Synod of North America, (Minn., i92o) 175 N. W. 699, a pay patient
in a charitable hospital was killed due to the negligence of one of the nurses.
Although it was not shown that the defendant had negligently hired or
knowingly keptin its employ an incompetent person, nevertheless, held, the
corporation was liable in damages for the negligence of its employee.
The first American case to announce this view was Glavin v. Rhode
Island Hospital, 12 R. I. 411; but shortly after that decision was handed
down, it was negatived by the Rhode Island legislature. See General Laws
of Rhode Island (I896), pp. 538, 539. In x915, the Supreme Court of Ala-
bama arrived at the same result in Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n., 191
Ala. 572, which case now stands as the law in that jurisdiction.
One of the earliest United States decisions upon the question is Mc-
Donald v. Mass. General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432. The authority depended
upon is the English case of Holliday v. St. Leonard, iI C. B. (N.S.) 191.
But it is to be noted that the principle of the Holliday case was overruled
by Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, L. R., i H. L. 93. And, in accord with the latter
case, the modern English decisions have established the liability of charitable
corporations in these cases. Gilbert v. Trinity House, L. R., 17 Q. B. D. 795;
Hillyer v. Governors of St. Bartholomew's Hospital, L. R. i9o9, 2 K. B. 82o.
The same rule is laid down by the Ontario Supreme Court in Lavere v. Hos-
pital, 35 Ont. L. Rep. 98. In this country, the McDonald Case has been gen-
erally followed, and is repeatedly referred to as the leading case upon the
question. 6 Cyc. 975; Taylor v. Hospital, 85 Ohio St. 90, 39 L. R. A. (N.S.)
427. See 5 MicH L. R~v. 552.
Although the very great weight of American authority favors the rule
of exemption, the reasons given in support of the rule are by no means
harmonious. There are three bases, upon one or more of which all the
decisions rest. These we may call the "trust fund theory," the "public policy
theory," and the "implied assent theory." They will be discussed in order.
The "trust fund theory" is to the effect that all funds of a charitable
institution are held in trust for the particular charitable purpose, and that
the payment of damages for injuries to patients and inmates due to the
negligence of the employees of the institution is not a purpose contemplated
by the trust, and that therefore the funds cannot be diverted to the payment
thereof. The objection to this reasoning is that it proves too much. Followed
to its logical conclusion, it would result in exempting such corporations from
the payment of damages upon any claim. But a recovery for injuries is
allowed by one not an inmate. Basabo v. Salvation Army, 35 R. I. 22, 42 L. R.
A. (N.S.) 144; Van Ingen v. Jewish Hospital of Brooklyn, 164 N. Y. Supp.
832; Tehomas v. German General Benevolent Society, 168 Cal. 183; 5 RULING
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CASE LAw 378. Also, many courts which exempt hospitals from liability for
the negligent acts of their employees nevertheless hold them liable for negli-
gence in hiring incompetent servants. Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66
Conn. 98; Van Tassell v. Manhattan Eye and Ear Hospital, 15 N. Y. Supp.
620; U. P. Ry Co. v. Artist, 6o Fed. 365; Plant System, etc. v. Dickerson, i8
Ga. 647; Ry. Co. v. Buchanan, 126 Ky. 288; McDonald v. Mass. General Hos-
pital, supra; Thornton v. Franklin Square House, 200 Mass. 465. Such hold-
ings are absolutely inconsistent with the trust fund theory. A number of the
courts, although supporting the majority rule, nevertheless disapprove the
trust fund theory as a basis for the exemption. Bruce v. Central Methodist
Episcopal Church, 147 Mich. 230; Hewitt v. Woman's Hospital Ass'n., 73
N. H. 556; Horden v. Salvation Army, i99 N. Y. 233, 32 L. R. A. (N.S.) 62.
This doctrine is open to such serious doubt that it would seem to furnish, no
solid foundation for the rule.
The second theory relied upon is that public policy is opposed to applying
the doctrine of respondeat superior to charitable hospitals. It is argued that
the public has an interest in the maintenance of these institutions which min-
ister to the sick and needy, and that therefore they should not be discouraged
by subjecting them to claims for damages by those who seek their aid. The
public is indeed interested in the continuance of these charities, "but it also
has an interest in obliging every person and every corporation which under-
takes the performance of a duty to perform it carefully." Glavin v. Rhode
Island Hospital, supra. It is further urged that the doctrine of respondeat
superior does not apply because the servant or agent is not acting for the
profit of the master. It seems clear, however, that the liability for negligence
of either a natural or an artificial person, by its own act or by agent, depends
upon a failure to properly perform a duty imposed by law, regardless of
whether money is made in the performance of that duty. Gilbert v. Trinity
House, supra. If the public policy theory of exemption is sound, no reason
appears why it should not be applied in cases where the person injured is not
a patient or an inmate of the institution. And yet such persons have been
allowed to recover for injuries received from negligent employees. Basabo
v. Salvation Army, supra; Van Ingen v. Jewish Hospital of Brodklyn, supra;
Thomas v. German General Benevolent Society, supra; 5 RuLING CASZ LAW
378. This theory, like the trust fund theory, is open to so much criticism
that it can hardly be said to offer a satisfactory basis for the exemption.
The "implied assent theory" announces that the one who accepts the
benefit of a charity impliedly assumes the risk of injuries due to negligence
of his benefactor's agents. As stated in Powers v. Mass. Homeopathic Hos-
pital, io9 Fed. 294; 65 L. R. A. 372, the beneficiary of such a charitable trust
enters into a contract whereby he assumes the risk of the kind of torts under
discussion. This theory is adopted in Bruce v. Central Methodist Episcopal
Church, supra; Adams v. University Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675; Schloen-
dorff v. Society of N. Y. Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 52 L. R. A. (N.S.) 505.
A view of the more recent cases shows that this is coming to be the prevail-
ing basis of decision, and it is believed that when it is not unduly extended
in its application it is sound. It is only when this theory is applied to those
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who actually paid full compensation for the services received that the reason-
ing breaks down, for the plaintiff is not then the recipient of charity and
cannot be logically said to have waived any right. The California court
has apparently failed to distinguish between the cases of pay and charity
patients. In Burdell et ux. v. St. Luke's Hospital, (Cal., 1918), 173 Pac. l0O8,
the decision is based upon the implied assent theory, but the court goes on to
say, "The fact that plaintiff paid the regular rates charged by the hospital
for paying patients does not take the case out of the operation of this rule,
for it is apparent that the rates were not charged with a view of making a
.profit from her." Also, in Duncan v. Nebraska Sanitarium, 92 Neb. 162, 41
L. R. A. (N.S.) 973, the court says, by way of dictum, that the rule applies
equally to those who have paid full compensation. The Georgia Court takes
the opposite view, but limits the recovery to funds derived strictly from non-
charitable pay patients. Morton v. Savannah Hospital, (Ga., 1918), 96 S. E.
887. In Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n., supra, the patient paid full rates,
and the court expressly reserved the question of a charity patient until it
should arise. In the Diakonniessenverein Case, the court used language
broad enough to include charity patients, but as that question was not before
the court, its remarks in this regard are simply dictum. Modern tendency
seems to lean toward basing the exemption upon the contractual relation
which arises by reason of the giving and receiving of charity, and this, it is
submitted, represents the correct logical basis for the decisions.
L. H. M.
